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1 Introduction 
A classic finding in the empirical international trade literature is the existence of a dampening 
effect of national borders on the volume of trade. One explanation for this "border effect" is 
the existence of a home-bias, understood as the tendency to award contracts to domestic firms 
compared to foreign competitors.1 Since home bias works similarly to a tariff that distorts 
competition,2 it is likely to have a very detrimental effect on welfare. 
In most industrialized countries public procurement accounts for a substantial share of GDP.3 
The liberalisation of procurement practices, in particular, with the aim of increasing cross-
border procurement, has therefore been on the agenda of policy makers for a long time.4 
Despite this, studies that empirically document and quantify the effect of borders on public 
procurement outcomes are scarce. 
In this paper we fill this gap in the literature by documenting and quantifying border effects 
in public procurement in the European Single Market. Our empirical analysis is based on 2.3 
million European public procurement contracts awarded from 2010 to 2014 and published in 
the EU’s Tenders Electronic Daily database (TED). We match geo-locations to the address 
information in the data and then assign NUTS3 regions to tenderers and winning bidders to 
create a data set that consists of 1,362x1,362 bilateral public procurement flows between 
NUTS3 region pairs. Following the seminal work of McCallum (1995), we then use this data 
set to estimate a gravity model of bilateral procurement flows with border effects.5  
Despite accounting for NUTS3 origin and destination fixed effects, geographic and cultural 
distance, and common currency and language, we document evidence of very substantial  
intra- and international border effects in European public procurement. In our baseline 
specification, we find for example that a local firm – a firm located in the same NUTS3 
region as the tendering authority -- is about twice as likely to win a contract compared to a 
firm located in the same NUTS2, but in a different NUTS3. We document the most sizable 
effect for cross-national border effects: a local firm is about 1300 times more likely to be 
awarded a contract compared to a foreign firm. Our results hold for goods, services, and 
construction procurement and for different types of public procurement procedures and award 
criteria. We also show that cultural differences across countries, to the degree to which they 
can be quantitatively captured, can only explain a relatively small part of the border effect. 
The extent of the border effects we find is surprising since formal trade barriers have been 
abolished in the European Single Market by 1968. At least since the mid-1980s the EU also 
increasingly abolished non-tariff barriers, such as differences in standards or technical 
regulations that are imposed by national governments for health and safety reasons. 
                                                          
1
 Home bias has also been documented in many other contexts such as, for example, asset holdings (French and 
Poterba, 1991; Lewis, 1999; Ahearne et al., 2004), the wind turbine industry (Coşar et al., 2015), online 
products markets (Hortaçsu et al., 2009), online crowdfunding markets (Lin and Viswanathan, 2015). 
2
 See, for example, Mattoo (1996) and Trionfetti (2000) for a discussion on the welfare effects in the case of 
discriminatory public procurement. 
3
 For example, the estimate of total general government public procurement expenditure, excluding utilities and 
defence, was 1931.5 billion euros in 2014, or about 13% of EU GDP (Public Procurement Indicators 2014, 
European Commission, February 2, 2016). 
4
 Early efforts to bring government procurement under internationally agreed trade rules were undertaken in the 
OECD framework. The matter was then brought into the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations within GATT in 
1976. The revised GPA entered into force on 6 April 2014. More recently, tackling the barriers to cross-border 
procurement has been identified as a policy priority in a Commission Staff Working Document (accessible at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015SC0202). 
5
 See Head and Mayer (2014) for a review on the border effect and the gravity equation in international trade. 
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Moreover, there have been substantial efforts to also reduce informal barriers, for example, 
by standardizing various elements of public procurement procedures6 and by moving towards 
procurement digitalisation. Our findings suggest that barriers of substantial magnitude to 
cross-border procurement remain. Although there are several other potential explanations for 
the sizable border effects we document, our results are indicative of home bias in European 
public procurement. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We relate our paper to the relevant 
existing literature in the next section. In Section 3 we discuss the data that we use in this 
article. In Section 4 we present our estimation strategy. We discuss results in Section 5. In the 
final section we summarize, discuss policy implications, and point out potential avenues for 
future research. 
2 Related Literature 
This paper is related to a strand of literature that documents the negative impact of borders on 
the volume of trade using the gravity equation. McCallum (1995) initiated this literature by 
showing that the US-Canadian border had an unexpectedly strong effect: controlling for 
numerous variables, trade between the Canadian provinces was about 22 times higher than 
their trade with US states.7  
An obvious explanation for the home bias in trade is that formal or informal national barriers 
to trade such as tariffs, quotas, or regulatory differences must be responsible for this finding. 
More recently, however, it became clear that there must be additional reasons because sizable 
border effects were also found to exist in the supposedly highly integrated EU single market 
(Nitsch, 2000; Chen, 2004), on the subnational in the US (Wolf, 2000, Hillberry and 
Hummels, 2003, Coughlin and Novy, 2013, Crafts and Klein, 2015), and even on the zip-
code level (Hillberry and Hummels, 2008). Crafts and Klein (2015) find that agglomeration 
effects explain at least part of the home bias in trade. Consequently, they might also explain a 
part of the home bias we document here for public procurement, however, the sheer size of 
the home bias we document makes clear that discrimination still seems to be at work.  
This paper is also related to a literature that empirically documents some evidence of home 
bias in public procurement based on descriptive statistics. A study carried out for the 
European Commission reports that in the European Union only 1.6% of contracts awarded 
under the rules of the EU procurement Directives (or 3.5% of their value) were won by non-
domestic bidders.89 Using Eurostat input-output data, the same study concluded that import 
                                                          
6
 Examples are the standardization of procurement-specific nomenclature by creating the Common Procurement 
Vocabulary (CPV) and the introduction of standard forms for publication. 
7
 We refer the reader to Head and Mayer (2014) for more recent estimates of the border effect in trade. 
8
 “Cross-border procurement above EU thresholds”, 2011, by Ramboll Management Consulting and the 
University of Applied Sciences HTW Chur. 
9
 This is defined in the study as "direct" cross-border procurement. Alternatively, they define a broader category 
of "indirect" cross-border procurement that includes for example, awards won by local subsidiaries of foreign 
companies and by consortia of foreign and local firms. In our paper we consider only direct cross-border 
procurement. 
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penetration differs significantly between the public and private sectors (7.5% to 19.1% 
respectively), stating that this difference between the public and private sectors is largely due 
to differences in the kinds of goods, services and works procured (i.e. that the public sector 
tends to relatively purchase more services, which are usually less tradable than goods). One 
should therefore not exclude the possibility that the home bias could just stem from a 
composition effect. We control for that by fitting our model to subsamples of procurement of 
goods, services and construction works and we find sizeable and significant border effects in 
all of them. 
Similarly, Trionfetti (2000) and Bruehlhart and Trionfetti (2001) show that the import share 
of private sector purchases is substantially higher than the import share of government 
purchases and interpret this as home bias in public procurement. The most recent paper in this 
literature is Shingal (2015) who explores several explanations for the relatively low share of 
foreign procurement in Switzerland and Japan for the years 1990-2003. 
The present paper adds to this literature in several ways. Methodologically, this paper is the 
first that follows the trade literature and quantifies the home bias by estimating bilateral 
procurement flows using a gravity equation. This approach has several advantages. Firstly, it 
allows us to quantify the home bias while controlling for other explanatory variables, in 
particular geographical distance as well as origin- and destination fixed effects. Secondly, 
unlike in the existing descriptive literature where home bias is often simply defined as a 
"relatively" low share of public vs. private import propensity, a formal test of home bias is 
straightforward in our estimation framework: home bias exists in case of a significant border 
coefficient in the estimated gravity equation. Thirdly, because of the fine aggregation of our 
data, we can explore home bias not only across but also within countries. 
3 Data Description 
This study is based on European public procurement contract awards published on the 
European Union's Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) website. We use the address information 
of the contracting authority or entity (CAE) and the winning firms in the data to construct a 
data set that consists of bilateral procurement flows between NUTS3 region pairs. This data 
set is then used to estimate a gravity equation with border effects. 
3.1 Institutional Background and Tenders Electronic Daily 
TED is an online supplement10 to the Official Journal of the EU containing the details of 
public procurement notices published under the coverage of the EU public procurement 
Directives.11 These Directives are relevant for and transposed by the EU member states and 
Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein (altogether the European Economic Area, EEA). 
                                                          
10
 The supplement is available online at http://ted.europa.eu/TED/.  
11
 Currently the Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, the Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and 
postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, the Directive 2014/23/EU of the European 
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TED contains information about different types of procurement notices12 that reflect the 
various administrative stages of the public procurement process followed by the CAEs13 
subject to the Directives. A "contract notice" announces the call for tenders for the provision 
of works, goods, or services. From it, firms are able to learn relevant information for their 
bids, like technical specifications, deadlines, award criteria, and other procedural aspects. 
Then, the CAE assesses the offers and decides who to award the procurement contract to. It is 
often the case that the procurement requested in a single contract notice is awarded to several 
firms. This may happen for instance when the contract notice is structured in different lots for 
which it is possible to bid separately. A single contract notice can therefore lead to one or 
more contract awards.14 In this paper we use information at the contract award level.  
The contract awards contain, amongst others, information regarding 
• the name and address of the contracting authority or entity, 
• the name and address of the winning firm,15  
• the value of the tender initially expected by the CAE,  
• the final value of the tender,  
• the number of bids,  
• the date of the award,  
• the specific award criterion used in the tender, 
• and the Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) - a code which serves to identify 
the type of good, service, or work to be procured.  
All contract notices whose value exceeds a certain amount are subject to the public 
procurement Directives and must be published in TED because they are presumed to be of 
cross-border interest. These thresholds are set in the Directives and updated every two 
years.16 The thresholds apply to the (expected) total value of the contract notice and not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, and Directive 
2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and 
service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security. 
12
 A complete list of the different public procurement standard forms can be found in the TED website at 
http://simap.ted.europa.eu/standard-forms-for-public-procurement. 
13
 A contracting authority would be for example a ministry or a city council, whereas a contracting entity would 
be a publicly owned firm. 
14
 Technically, the award decisions stemming from the contract notice are published through one or more 
"contract award notices." For example, one single contract notice can be followed by just one contract award 
notice which includes various contract awards. However, it can also be the case that there are several contract 
award notices, each one including one single contract award. Any combination of these two situations is also 
possible, depending on the specificities of each procurement process. From a formal point of view, a contract 
award notice is a standard form, whereas a contract award (or award decision) is a specific section within the 
standard form for a contract award notice. In any case, the actual complexity and options in the procurement 
process stablished by the Directives is much richer than the one presented in this stylised example. 
15
 The data set only contains information on the winning bidder, but not on the other bidding firms.  
16
 The complete list of current thresholds is available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-
procurement/rules-implementation/thresholds_en. As an illustration, in the context of the general procurement 
covered by Directive 2014/24/EU (i.e., procurement not related to the defence sector, specific utilities sectors or 
concessions) the procurement of supplies and services by central government authorities has a threshold of Euro 
135,000, although subsidized services or certain services specifically listed have higher thresholds. Works 
contracts have a threshold of Euro 5,225,000. 
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separately to each of the contract award notices and contract awards that stem from it. It is 
not unusual that a contract notice of large value translates into many contract awards of 
smaller values that in some cases are below the corresponding threshold. Even in these cases 
it is compulsory to publish those lower-value contract awards. In practice, this implies that 
many of the contract awards that we have in our sample have values below the thresholds of 
the Directives. Moreover, another reason to observe below-threshold contract awards in our 
dataset is that publication in TED is perceived as a sign of openness and many CAEs decide 
to publish in TED on a voluntary basis. Therefore, although the TED data base does not 
include all public procurement exchanges, it does include the most of it in terms of value. 
3.2 Construction of the Data Set 
We use a subset of the TED data that consists of approximately 2.3 million contract awards 
published between 2010 and 2014. Based on the address information in the data, we assign 
the NUTS3 region17 of the CAE and the winning firm to each contract award.18 We then 
construct a data set that consists of bilateral procurement flows tendered by CAEs located in 
NUTS3 region ݅ and awarded to firms located in NUTS3 region ݆. We refer to these as the 
"origin NUTS3" and the "destination NUTS3," respectively, in the following. We limit our 
sample to origin and destination regions within the EU plus Norway and Lichtenstein. Since 
there are such 1,362 NUTS3 regions, the data set has 1,362 x 1,362 = 1,855,044 observations 
where each observation represents a NUTS3 region pair. We add NUTS3 level information 
on population figures from Eurostat.19  
In our empirical analysis we use two variables capturing the extent of procurement flows 
between pairs of regions. Firstly, we use the variable ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜,௝	that we define as the total value 
of projects tendered by CAEs in NUTS3 region ݅ and won by firms located in region ݆. Given 
that the information on final values of awarded contracts is sometimes missing, we also use 
the variable ݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ௜,௝	 that is defined as the number of total contracts (i.e. not weighted by 
their value) published by CAEs located in NUTS3 region ݅ and awarded to firms in region ݆. 
Moreover, we construct variants of these variables that only contain the value of awarded 
contracts or the number of projects in goods, services, or construction. Descriptive statistics 
of the main variables used in this study are presented in Table 1. 
                                                          
17
 European NUTS regions are territorial nomenclatures based primarily on the current institutional divisions of 
the respective country, following national regional classifications of generic nature (as opposed to specific 
regional classifications such as mining regions or rail traffic regions, for example). The NUTS classification has 
three levels, with NUTS1 and NUTS2 roughly corresponding to, respectively, regions and provinces within a 
country (the NUTS0 level). The NUTS3 level corresponds to a less important administrative structure that 
should have an average population between 150.000 and 800.000 inhabitants. NUTS regions can change over 
time following the needs of the respective countries. In this paper we have followed the NUTS 2013 
classification. The respective shape file can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/administrative-units-statistical-units. 
18
 There are 239,728 distinct town/postal code combinations in our data. For each of these distinct town/postal 
code combinations, we obtain the latitude and longitude using the Google Maps API. By combining this data 
with the Eurostat shape file on NUTS3 regions in Europe, we then assign a NUTS3 region to each CAE and to 
each winning firm in our dataset. 
19
 Note that we ignore public contracts won by countries outside of the EEA since the share is negligible. 
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3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Before turning to the estimation of the gravity equation, we report some descriptive statistics. 
Table 2 provides an overview of cross-region and cross-border procurement. Column (2) of 
Panel A documents that of all projects that were tendered in one of the 1,362 NUTS3 regions 
in our sample, 31% were won by a firm in the same NUTS3 region. 16% were won by firms 
located in other NUTS3 regions within the same NUTS2. 50% (10.8%+39.7%) came from 
the rest of the country and, finally, about 1.3% were awarded to firms located outside of the 
country, that is, in a different NUTS0. Columns (3) to (8) show that at both the NUTS0 and 
NUTS3 levels the share of cross-border procurement is highest for goods and smaller for 
services and construction works. Panel B shows that we obtain very similar results when 
projects are weighted by their value.  
Figure 1 visualizes the share of awards by CAEs located in a NUTS3 region that are awarded 
to firms located in other countries (a different NUTS0). While in general the share of cross-
border procurement in the whole EU is low, the map shows that it is not driven by any 
specific region or Member State. Scandinavian and Baltic countries have a relatively higher 
cross-border share. The map also suggests that in (geographically) larger countries, like 
France or Spain, NUTS3 regions closer to the border show higher rates compared to regions 
in the interior. This effect is particularly apparent is smaller countries like the Benelux and 
the central-eastern EU area.  
It is important to note that, despite being highly suggestive, the evidence reported in in Figure 
1 and Table 2 cannot be unambiguously interpreted as evidence of border effects in public 
procurement. The fact that only few cross-region and cross-border awards take place might 
be simply because trade costs increase with distance. This is also in line with the finding that 
we find stronger border effect in the raw data for construction and services than for goods 
procurement, since the former are more costly to trade over large distance than the latter. 
Figure 2, however, presents more descriptive evidence that the border effects we document 
are indeed due to a border effects, and not just driven by trade costs. The map in the upper 
left visualizes the geographic distribution of contracts awarded published by authorities 
located in the NUTS2 region around Frankfurt am Main (DEA2) (marked in green). It is 
clearly visible that the probability that firms in a given region win an award is decreasing in 
the distance to the DEA2 NUTS2. Almost no trade across national borders is visible. 
However, this might be just due to the distance effect. The upper right panel shows a similar 
map for contracts published by authorities located the NUTS2 region Cologne (DEA2) which 
adjacent to Germany's national border with Belgium and the Netherlands and close to the 
border with Luxembourg. This map now provides very clear evidence that the national border 
matters greatly for procurement: it is apparent that firms based in German NUTS3 regions of 
equal distance to Cologne have a much higher probability of being awarded a contract than 
equivalent firms in the Netherlands, Belgium, or Luxembourg. 
Figure 2 shows another example. The two Mediterranean islands Corsica and Sardinia are 
located next to each other; however, the first is part of France while the second is part of 
Italy. The contract awards clearly reflect this: in spite of similar distance to Italy and France, 
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99.8% and 99.5% of contracts published by authorities located in Corsica and Sardinia are 
awarded to France and Italy, respectively. 
In the next section, we present a formal way of quantifying border effects in European public 
procurement based on the gravity model following the methodology proposed in the seminal 
paper by McCallum (1995). 
4 Estimation Strategy 
The first approach we use to quantify the border effect in European public procurement is 
based on the traditional gravity equation. We use the popular gravity model that has widely 
used in the analysis of international trade and more recently in other fields, such as migration 
and even innovation policy.20  
We propose a constant-elasticity model of the form 
݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ_ݓ݋݊௜,௝ = exp൫ࢄ௜,௝ࢼ൯ + ߝ௜,௝ 
with ݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ_ݓ݋݊௜௝ ≥ 0, ܧൣߝ௜,௝|ࢄ௜,௝൧ = 0, and 
 ࢄ௜,௝ࢼ = ݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ_ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ௜ + ߚଵ ln ݌݋݌௜ + ߚଶ ln ݌݋݌௝ + ߚଷ ln ݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௝
+ ߚସݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵ0௜,௝ + ߚହݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵ1௜,௝ + ߚ଺ݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵ2௜,௝
+ ߚ଻ݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵ3௜,௝ 
(1) 
 
The dependent variable ݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ_ݓ݋݊௜௝ is the number of tenders awarded to firms in NUTS3 
region ݆ tendered by CAEs located in NUTS3 region ݅. Since by construction the probability 
to win a tender from a NUTS3 region that launches more tenders is higher, we use the total 
projects tendered by CAEs located in region ݅ ݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ_ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ௜ as an offset variable.21  
We expect tenders awarded by a NUTS3 region to rise proportionally to the economic 
activity of the origin NUTS3 region and tenders awarded to a NUTS3 region rise 
proportionally to the size of the destination NUTS3 region. We therefore include log-
population of region ݅ and ݆ (݌݋݌௜ and ݌݋݌௝) as control variables. 
We expect that the distance between two NUTS3 regions (݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௝ ) and the bilateral 
procurement flow between these two regions have a negative relationship. Distance both 
captures the transportation cost due to physical distance, however, some argue that it also 
proxies transaction and information cost more generally (Portes and Rey, 2005)). As 
                                                          
20
 See Section 2.4 in Head and Mayer (2014). 
21
 One obtains the same results by using the ratio ௣௥௢௝௘௖௧௦_௪௢௡೔,ೕ௣௥௢௝௘௖௧௦_௧௢௧௔௟೔  as the dependent variable and weighting the 
regression by ݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ_ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ௜. 
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proposed by Leamer (1997) and Nitsch (2000), we calculate intra-NUTS3 distances based on 
land area.22  
Our main estimates of interest are the coefficients on the dummy-variables ݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵܺ௜,௝ 
that capture the border effects we want to estimate. We measure border effects at the NUTS0, 
i.e., the country-level, the NUTS1, NUTS2, and the NUTS3 level. The dummies take the 
value 1 when ݅ and ݆ are in the same NUTSX. 
A potential problem of specification (1) is that coefficient estimates might be biased due to 
omitted variable bias.23 We address this problem in our baseline approach by including fixed 
effects for both the destination and the origin NUTS3 regions:24 
 ࢄ௜,௝ࣂ = ݋ݎ݅݃௜ + ݀݁ݏݐ௝ + ߠଵ ln ݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௝ + ߠଶݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵ0௜,௝ + ߠଷݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵ1௜,௝
+ ߠସݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵ2௜,௝ + ߠହݏܽ݉݁_ܷܰܶܵ3௜,௝ 
(2) 
 
The fixed effects ݋ݎ݅݃௜  and ݀݁ݏݐ௝  capture unobserved characteristics of the origin NUTS3 
and the destination NUTS3.25  
The heavy concentration of awards to nearby regions described in Table 2 implies that the 
dependent variables reflecting the export flows between regions contain a large count of 
zeros and a long right tail in the dependent variables. In order to deal with the many zero 
values of the dependent variable and to avoid inconsistent estimates in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, we follow Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate specifications (1) and 
(2) by using Poisson (pseudo)-maximum likelihood (PPML) with Eicker-White robust 
standard errors.26 
5 Results 
In this section we present the estimation results of our gravity model and provide various 
robustness checks. We first show the baseline results using the sample of all contract awards. 
We then estimate the model separately for goods, services, and construction works 
procurement. In Section 5.3 we analyze the effect of different procedural details of the 
                                                          
22
 We follow Head and Mayer (2000) and calculate the intra-NUTS3 distance as ݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௜ = ൤ଶଷ ቀ
௔௥௘௔೔
గ ቁ
଴.ହ൨. 
23 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that the "traditional" gravity equation leads to biased estimates due 
to neglected exporter- and importer-specific multilateral resistance variables. One way of theory-consistent 
estimation of the gravity equation is to use importer and exporter fixed effects (e.g., Feenstra, 2015, Redding 
and Venables, 2004, and Section 3.3 in Head and Mayer, 2014). 
24
 The estimation of a gravity equation with import and exporter fixed effects is standard in the trade literature in 
order to account for (unobserved) multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). See, for 
example, Harrigan (1996), Hilberry and Hummels (2003), Coughlin and Novy (2013), and Section 3.3 in Head 
and Mayer (2014). 
25
 Note that since the model is purely cross-sectional, the variables ݌݋݌௜ , ݌݋݌௝ , and ݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ_ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ௝	 are not 
part of this extended model because they are captured by the origin and destination fixed effects. 
26
 Our data is clearly "over-dispersed", that is, the variance exceeds the mean. As advised by Head and Mayer 
(2014), we do not follow the recommendation by De Benedictis and Taglioni (2011) to use a negative binomial 
estimator in this case. Firstly, the PPML estimator remains consistent under over-dispersion. Secondly, as 
pointed out by Boulhol and Bosquet (2013), amongst other drawbacks, estimates based negative binomial model 
depend on the units of measurement of the dependent variable. 
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procurement process. Finally, we document to what extent cultural differences can explain 
the border effects. 
5.1 Main Results 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 3 report PPML estimates of regression equations (1) and (2) 
when the number of projects ݌ݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ௜௝ is the dependent variable. Column (1) shows results 
of the traditional gravity equation. Column (2) reports estimates of the extended gravity 
equation that includes fixed effects for the NUTS3 region of origin and destination. Our 
baseline specification in column (3) then adds dummy-variables for common language and 
whether the origin and destination NUTS3 region use a common currency (i.e., whether both 
use the Euro). 
In all our specifications we find that distance has a strong negative impact on the likelihood 
of winning a tender. According to our baseline specification in column (3), when the distance 
between the contracting authority's NUTS3 region and a given firm's NUTS3 regions 
doubles, the probability of that firm winning a tender decreases by about 32% (exp(-0.382)).  
We find evidence of substantial border effects at both international and intra-national levels 
in all three specifications. According to the baseline specification in column (3), firms located 
in the same NUTS3 as the contracting authority (hereafter "local firms") are two times 
(exp(0.722) = 2.06) more likely to win a tender than firms located in a different NUTS3 
within the same NUTS2 of the contracting authority. Firms located in a different NUTS2, but 
still within the same NUTS1 than the CAE are 4.6 times (exp(0.722+0.813) = 4.64) less 
likely to win than a local firm. Firms located in a different NUTS1 than the CAE are 7.25 
times (exp(0.722+0.813+0.452) = 7.257) less likely to win compared to local firms. The most 
substantial border effect is the international one: a local firm is almost 1300 times 
(exp(5.172+0.452+0.813+0.722)=1279.21) more likely to win than a foreign firm.  
One needs to be careful to not interpret these sizable border effects as trade barriers. As we 
discuss in more detail below, theory shows that the border effect is identical to the product of 
the elasticity of substitution between "local" and "non-local" goods, services, and works, and 
the tariff-equivalent of any border barrier (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). If goods, 
services, and works provided by "local" and "non-local" firms are very similar and therefore 
highly substitutable, a minor trade barrier or home bias can result in a very substantial border 
effect. 
Column (3) also shows that having the same language and the same currency increases the 
likelihood of winning a tender by about 159% (exp(0.954)=2.59) and 94% 
(exp(0.664)=1.94), respectively.27 
Columns (4) and (6) document that results are similar when ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜௝, the total final value of 
projects, is the dependent variable. Comparing columns (3) and (6), we find that when 
                                                          
27
 This finding is in line with Rose and van Wincoop (2001) who quantify the effect of different currencies on 
barriers to international trade. 
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weighted in by the total final value of the projects, distance becomes slightly more important. 
However, border effects altogether become slightly less important and having the same 
currency is no longer significant. This might be interpreted as evidence that discrimination is 
slightly smaller for bigger projects. 
5.2 Goods, Services, and Construction Works Procurement 
Apart from goods procurement, services and construction works procurement comprises a 
large share of projects in our data: Between 2010 and 2014 around 48% of awards referred to 
service or works contracts, equaling about 66% of the value of all awards (Table 2). While 
the baseline results reported in Table 3 are based on all contract awards in our data set, there 
are several reasons to expect that the determinants of goods procurement and of services and 
works procurement might differ, in particular regarding border and distance effects.28  
Firstly, the provision of works and most services, with the exception of, e.g., electronically 
delivered business services, requires physical contact between producers and consumers. 
Works and services are also more likely to be "tailored" to the customer and therefore 
potentially require monitoring and quality control (e.g., Freund and Weinhold, 2002). Their 
provision to distant locations is therefore often infeasible or very costly. Secondly, due to the 
higher requirement for personal interaction and communication, language and cultural issues 
might be relatively more important for the provision of services and construction than for the 
provision of goods. Finally, national regulations regarding the provision of services and 
works are widespread and potentially act as barriers to trade.29 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (2) using the subsamples of procurement 
of goods, services and construction works, both in terms of number of projects and of total 
final value of the projects. We find that distance is a much stronger deterrent of procurement 
flows for services, especially for construction works, than for goods. More precisely, when 
the distance between the CAE and the firm doubles, the likelihood of winning a tender for 
goods decreases by 26% (exp(-0.305)), whereas it reduces by almost 40% (exp(-0.614)) in 
the case of services procurement and by more than 65% (exp(-1.071)) in the case of 
construction. These results, based on the number of projects, are also confirmed in the sample 
weighted by the total final value of the projects (columns (4)-(6)). 
Combined border dummy variables play a more important role in the procurement of services 
than in goods or construction works. For instance, in services a local firm is almost 1900 
times (exp(4.863+0.721+1.004+0.955)) more likely to win than a foreign firm, while just 373 
times more (exp(3.677+0.725+0.725+0.797)) in the case of works and almost 700 
                                                          
28
 This is confirmed in the empirical trade literature. Using a gravity model, Kimura and Lee (2006) and Head et 
al. (2009) find that services trade is subject to stronger distance effects than goods trade. Similarly, using a 
structural gravity model, Anderson et al. (2015) find important differences in the determinants of goods and 
services trade. They document large border effects in services trade that vary widely by sector in an intuitive 
way. Importantly, they also show that border effect in services trade have been falling in the last years. This is 
line with the view that the emergence of the internet greatly facilitated the trade of certain services (Freund and 
Weinhold; 2002, 2004). See also Tharakan et al. (2005) who, using gravity framework, finds no distance effect 
of Indian software (services) exports. 
29
 See, for example, Nordås and Rouzet (2015) and Nordås (2016). 
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(exp(5,688+0,182+0,467+0,206)) times more in the case of goods. However, intra-national 
border effects are clearly higher in the case of services and construction works. For example, 
compared to a national firm located in a different NUTS1 than the CAE, a local firm is 14.6 
times (exp(0,721+1,004+0,955)) more likely to win a service contract and 9.5 times 
(exp(0,725+0,725+0,797)) more likely to win a works contract. In the procurement of goods 
the local firm will only be 2.3 (exp(0,182+0,467+0,206)) times more likely to win. These 
results suggest that within national borders the procurement trade is easier for goods than for 
services and works. Conversely, the border effects are higher for the procurement of goods. 
This mixed effect of intra- and international cross border dummies is consistent with the 
theory of Coughlin and Novy (2016) postulating that countries with larger internal trade 
frictions tend to have smaller border effects.30 
We also find support for the hypothesis that services and construction works require 
relatively more personal interaction and communication and that having the same language is 
therefore more important. For construction works and services, having the same language 
increases the likelihood of an award by about 600% and 200%, respectively, while this figure 
is only 50% for goods.31 
The effect of sharing the same currency is smaller in magnitude and less clear. While the 
same currency is most important for goods and least important for construction works when 
the number of projects is the dependent variable, this pattern is reversed when the final value 
of projects is considered in columns (4) to (6). This implies that while having different 
currencies might represent barrier to the procurement of relatively low value goods, the 
importance decreases when value is taken into account. One reason why having the same 
currency is relatively more important for construction works is potentially that the duration of 
projects is longer and the contracting parties are therefore more exposed to exchange rate 
fluctuations. We leave it for future research to explore this issue in more detail. 
In summary, while we find important differences between border effect of public 
procurement of goods, services, and construction works, border effects are sizable for each 
type of procurement we consider. 
5.3 Procedural Details: Award Criteria and Type of Procedure 
In this section we analyse whether the border effects we document above could be driven by 
the choice of certain administrative procedures. We analyse the effect of the award criterion 
used in a tender and whether a tender is published under an "open" or "restricted" procedure. 
5.3.1 Award Criteria 
                                                          
30
 Coughlin and Novy (2016) build a model of symmetric micro regions which are aggregated to form larger 
regions. Spatial frictions increase the relative cost of intra-national trade such that internal trade frictions are 
relatively larger for larger countries. As a consequence, the relative cost of cross-border trade becomes relatively 
smaller. In our econometric model, the subsamples of procurement of goods, services and construction works 
can be subject to different types of trade frictions, including spatial ones. Following the theory of Coughlin and 
Novy (2016) we can thus expect that whenever intra-national trade faces higher barriers, the corresponding 
border effects will be relatively smaller, and the other way round. 
31
 Respectively, exp(1.950)-1, exp(1.131)-1, and exp(0.411)-1. 
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The public procurement Directives32 provide that the CAE shall base the award of public 
contracts either on the lowest price only or on the so-called "most economically advantageous 
tender" (MEAT). Under the MEAT criterion, other factors than price (like quality, cost-
effectiveness, after-sales service, etc.) are taken into account for the award.33 In our sample 
48% and 45% of the contracts have been awarded following the lowest price and MEAT 
criterion, respectively (Table 2).34 From a geographic point of view, lowest price is relatively 
more popular in Eastern EU member states. 
The price-only criterion is directly comparable and in principle less subject to product 
differentiation effects that can soften competition. Therefore, it could be the case that regions 
where MEAT is more prevalent show lower rates of cross-border procurement because 
foreign firms may find it more difficult to bid competitively taking into account factors other 
than price that can be linked to local preferences or specificities. 
Panels A and B in Table 5 present the results for the subsamples of tender using the MEAT 
and lowest price criterion, respectively. The national border effect captured by same_NUTS0 
remains sizable and statistically significant for both subsamples. The intra-national border 
effects are larger in general in the case of MEAT. In particular, the coefficient of 
same_NUTS3 is substantially larger in the subsample of MEAT, suggesting that when factors 
other than price are included in the assessment of tenders the firms located in the same 
NUTS3 as the CAE increase their chances of winning compared to other firms in the country. 
In line with this, the negative impact of distance on the likelihood to win is more important in 
the MEAT subsample (with the exception of construction works, where both are of similar 
levels). Also, having a common language and currency are also more important determinants 
in the case of MEAT than lowest price. Overall, there is strong evidence that intra-national 
trade is subject to higher barriers in the case of MEAT than lowest price. Conversely, the 
international border effect is relatively higher for the subsample of lowest price, which is line 
with the theory proposed by Coughlin and Novy (2016), as discussed previously. 
Qualitatively, the same results hold when the total final value is considered instead of the 
number of projects. 
5.3.2 Type of Procedure 
The public procurement Directives35 establish the general obligation of CAEs to award public 
contracts by using so called "open" or "restricted" procedures. In an open procedure any 
interested firm can submit a tender whereas in a restricted procedure any firm can request to 
participate in the tendering process but only those firms invited by the CAE will be able to 
submit a tender. 
Under specific circumstances other procedures can be used. These are for instance the 
"negotiated" procedure, which can take place with or without the publication of a previous 
                                                          
32
 See Directive 2004/18/EC and Directive 2004/17/EC. 
33
 The new Directives 2014/24/EC and 2014/25/EC set, without prejudice to national legislations, MEAT as the 
preferential award mechanism. 
34
 For the remaining awards information on the award criterion used is missing. 
35
 See Directive 2004/18/EC and Directive 2004/17/EC. 
14 
 
contract notice, and the "competitive dialogue." In a negotiated procedure the CAE consults 
the firms of its choice and negotiates the terms of the contract with them. In a competitive 
dialogue the CAE usually has a specific procurement need, i.e., a need for which a suitable 
solution is not readily available in the market. Any firm can request to participate in the 
process, but the CAE can select those with which to discuss the manners to satisfy its need 
and following those discussions the CAE is allowed to narrow down further the list of firms 
allowed to submit a tender.36 
The open and restricted procedures may be regarded as the more competitive ones in nature. 
They are also the most commonly used: About 90% of projects (85% when measured 
according to value) in our data sets are tendered either according to the "open" or "restricted" 
procedure (see Table 1). 
Table 6 shows the results of estimating equation (2) when only projects that use the "open" or 
"restricted" procedure are considered. When comparing the results to column (3) and (6) in 
Table 3 and to the results in Table 4, it is apparent that the results are very similar. The border 
effects that we document above are therefore not a result of the tendering procedure. 
5.4 Cultural Differences 
In this section we explore to what extent differences in cultural values can explain border 
effects in public procurement. Recent research has shown that cultural values are an 
important determinant of economic exchange. In a standard gravity model, Felbermayr and 
Toubal (2010) and Tadesse and White (2007) find that measures of cultural proximity 
positively affect trade volumes for Europe and the US, even after controlling for fixed effects 
and other covariates. Guiso et al. (2009) document that bilateral trust, as a reflection of 
cultural biases, has an important impact trade, portfolio investments, and FDI between 
European countries. Other research finds that cultural differences affect interest rates in 
international syndicated bank loans (Gianetti and Yafeh, 2010), venture-capital flows 
(Bottazzi et al., 2016), cross-regional migration flows (Falck et al., 2012), and the volume of 
cross-border mergers (Ahern et al., 2015).  
The most well-known approaches to construct measures of cultural values are the European 
Values Study and the World Values Survey, the five-dimension classification system of 
Hofstede (1980, 2001), the three- dimension system of Schwartz (1994), the seven-dimension 
system of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2011), and the four-dimension system of Fiske 
(1991). Because the importance of trust for economic exchange is well documented, and 
since measures of "hierarchy" and "individualism" are shared by all of the above 
classification systems, we follow Ahern et al. (2015) and measure cultural values by using 
respondents' answers in the 2008 and 200937 waves of the European Values Study to three 
questions capturing the attitude regarding the following aspects: 
                                                          
36
 There exists also a variant of the negotiated and restricted procedures called "accelerated," where deadlines 
are shortened if additional conditions are met. 
37
 We use the latest waves available. Belgium, Finland, Italy, Sweden, and Great Britain were surveyed in 2009, 
the rest of countries in our sample and Northern Ireland were surveyed in 2008. 
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1. Trust versus distrust: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?" 
 
2. Hierarchy versus egalitarianism: "People have different ideas about following 
instruction at work. Some say that one should follow instructions of one’s superiors 
even when one does not fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow 
one’s superior’s instructions only when is convinced that they are right. Which of 
these two opinions do you agree with?" 
 
3. Individualism versus collectivism: "Income equality. How would you place your 
views on this scale?" (From 1 “Incomes should be made more equal” to 10 “We need 
larger income differences as incentives”). 
 
Table 7 reports results when cultural differences between country ݅ and ݆ are operationalized 
as	ln൫1 + หΔݐݎݑݏݐ௜,௝ห൯,	ln൫1 + หΔℎ݅݁ݎܽݎܿℎݕ௜,௝ห൯, and ln൫1 + หΔ݅݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ݅ݏ݉௜,௝ห൯38, and 
are included as control variables in regression equation (2). The bilateral distance between 
two countries in terms of trust is always highly significant and has a negative impact on the 
number of cross-border procurement projects. Cultural distance as measured by hierarchy and 
individualism, on the other hand, is mostly not significantly different from zero. Since our 
measures of cultural differences only vary across but not within countries, coefficients on the 
same_NUTS1- same_NUTS3 are virtually not affected by the inclusion of the cultural 
distance variables. The coefficients of geographical distance, same language and same 
currency dummies remain also almost unchanged compared to the baseline specification. 
When comparing column (1) in Panel A of Table 7 to the baseline results in column (3) of 
Table 3, it is apparent that the estimated coefficient on the same_NUTS0 dummy is 
substantially smaller: when controlling for cultural distance, residing in the same country as 
the CAE (but in a different NUTS1) increases the likelihood of winning 126 fold 
(exp(4.486)) instead of 175 fold (exp(5.172)). The effect becomes much smaller, however, 
when projects are weighted by their value (Panel B). Cultural differences therefore seem to 
work as an implicit international trade barrier, however, only for relatively low-value public 
procurement. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we use a previously unexploited data set of 2.3 million public contract award 
decisions to empirically quantify border effects in public procurement in the European Single 
Market. We construct a data set of bilateral public procurement flows between NUTS3 region 
pairs and, following a methodology first proposed by McCallum (1995), we estimate a 
gravity model with border effects. We document very sizable inter- and intra-national border 
effects despite controlling for numerous variables, such as origin- and destination fixed 
effects, physical distance, common language and currency and cultural similarity.  
                                                          
38
 Note that unlike for example the trust matrix used in Guiso et al. (2009), these measures are symmetric, i.e., 
the distance from country ݅ to country ݆ is the same as the distance from ݆ to ݅. 
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In our baseline results we find evidence of both intra- and international border effects. For 
example, a local firm -- a firm located in the same NUTS3 region as the CAE -- is about 
twice as likely to win a contract as a non-local firm in the same NUTS2 region and it is about 
7 times more likely to be awarded compared to a firm in a different NUTS1 region. We 
document the most sizable border effects on the international level: a local firm is almost 
1300 times more likely to be awarded a contract than a foreign firm. We also document that, 
in line with the literature on empirical trade, the border effects are weaker for goods 
procurement and larger for construction works and services procurement. Moreover, we find 
that the award criterion used has an impact on the border effects: intra-national border effects 
when are larger the "most economically advantageous tender" instead of the "lowest price" 
criterion is used. The latter is of some policy importance, because since recently the former is 
now the preferential award mechanism. Finally, we find that cultural differences across 
European Member States can only explain a relatively small part of border effects. 
It is out of the scope of this paper to disentangle the relative importance of the many possible 
causal factors behind the border effects we document. Our findings, however, are surprising 
since customs duties and quantitative restrictions were progressively abolished in the 
European Single Market by 1968. We can therefore exclude that formal trade barriers are the 
reason for the border effects we document in this paper. Moreover, above-threshold European 
public procurement legislation is explicitly aimed at promoting cross-border procurement. In 
particular, tendering procedures have been harmonized in order to prevent the administrative 
burden of cross-border transactions. Also, the requirement that all above-threshold contracts 
must be publicized at the EU-level has been introduced. This implies that information 
asymmetries, that is, the fact that firms are simply unaware of ongoing tenders in other 
countries are unlikely to be the reason for the border effects.  
At least since the mid-1980s, the EU also focused on abolishing non-tariff barriers, such as 
differences in standards or technical regulations that are imposed by national governments for 
health and safety reasons.39 Moreover, there have been efforts to reduce "hidden" trade costs, 
such as the (real or perceived) relative difficulty in enforcing contracts across jurisdictions.40 
In any case, while remaining non-tariff barriers and "hidden" trade costs between countries 
might have some importance for national border effects, they cannot explain the substantial 
within-country border effects that we documented in this paper. 
Therefore, while there are other potential explanations of border effects,41 our results can be 
seen as being indicative of some home bias in public procurement. That is, our findings 
                                                          
39
 See, for example, the 1985 White Paper COM(85) 310 final "Completing the Internal Market" (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1985). We refer the reader to Head and Mayer (2000) for an economic evaluation 
of the "Single European Act" that was implementing some of the issues that were raised. Recent evidence that 
technical barriers diminish the trade volume of goods can be found in Chen (2004) and Essaji (2008). 
40
 For example, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show evidence that such "hidden" trade costs might reduce 
the volume of trade.  
41
 For example, in an experimental setting, Roux et al. (2016) find that tacit collusion based on the home-market 
principle can explain a major part of the observed home bias. Moreover, some of the border effects might be due 
to differences in national administrative procedures (while still being compliant with EU Directives). The 
existence of personal linkages or other network effects might also play a role. 
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suggest that contracting authorities might have a preference for consuming locally provided 
goods, services, and construction works. 
From a policy and welfare perspective an important aspect is the degree of similarity between 
"local" and "non-local" goods, services, and works. In particular, theory shows that the border 
effect is identical to the product of the elasticity of substitution between "local" and "non-
local" goods, services, and works, and the tariff-equivalent of any border barrier (e.g., 
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). If goods, services, and works provided by "local" and 
"non-local" firms are very similar and therefore highly substitutable, a minor trade barrier or 
home bias can result in a very substantial border effect. In this case, the consequences for 
welfare, however, would be minor and scope for policy action would be smaller. If, on the 
other hand, the substitutability is low and border effects are primarily driven by trade barriers, 
adverse welfare effects and the need for policy makers to act might be substantial (Evans, 
2003). 
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8 Tables and Figures 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
Number of Projects 0.97 49.26 0.00 28388.00
Goods 0.51 31.44 0.00 18418.00
Services 0.36 18.96 0.00 11486.00
Construction Works 0.10 6.81 0.00 4364.00
Total Final Value in Euros 0.10 6.08 0.00 4054.00
Goods 0.03 2.47 0.00 1452.00
No Goods 0.07 3.98 0.00 2637.00
Services 0.05 3.33 0.00 2576.00
Construction 0.02 1.31 0.00 776.60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
Number of Projects 0.43 21.18 0.00 10579.00
Goods 0.17 8.50 0.00 7975.00
Services 0.26 14.73 0.00 8198.00
Construction Works 0.06 5.47 0.00 3865.00
Total Final Value in Euros 0.05 2.84 0.00 1703.00
Goods 0.01 0.71 0.00 455.50
No Goods 0.02 1.60 0.00 1030.00
Services 0.03 2.22 0.00 1062.00
Construction 0.01 1.05 0.00 712.90
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
Number of Projects 0.86 44.24 0.00 26058.00
Goods 0.48 30.65 0.00 18242.00
Services 0.38 18.89 0.00 9769.00
Construction Works 0.09 5.79 0.00 3715.00
Total Final Value in Euros 0.08 4.94 0.00 3264.00
Goods 0.03 2.28 0.00 1432.00
Services 0.05 3.09 0.00 1950.00
Construction 0.02 1.17 0.00 689.50
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
Same Region Dummies
same_NUTS0 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
same_NUTS1 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
same_NUTS2 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00
same_NUTS3 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
Distance, in 1000km 1.14 0.89 0.00 13.42
Distance, in 1000km (log) -0.13 0.79 -6.60 2.60
Same Language 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Same Currency 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Panel A: All Projects
Panel C: Only Projects with "Open and Restricted" Type of Procedure
Panel D: Other Variables
Notes:  Descriptive statistics are shown. The number of observations is 1,855,044.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel B: Only Projects with "Most economically advantageous tender" award criteria
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number Share Number Share Value Share Value Share
Same NUTS3 561213 31.31% 198371 21.15% 275929 41.81% 86129 44.76%
Same NUTS2 300609 16.77% 127651 13.61% 132289 20.04% 40371 20.98%
Same NUTS1 194707 10.86% 102175 10.89% 70808 10.73% 21481 11.16%
Same Country 712017 39.73% 494158 52.68% 174381 26.42% 42890 22.29%
Different Country 23777 1.33% 15659 1.67% 6569 1.00% 1539 0.80%
Total 1792323 100.00% 938014 100.00% 659976 100.00% 192410 100.00%
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
Same NUTS3 274441 34.13% 70540 21.92% 145761 39.80% 57475 50.01%
Same NUTS2 136608 16.99% 40774 12.67% 71324 19.48% 24377 21.21%
Same NUTS1 87660 10.90% 38644 12.01% 39163 10.69% 9787 8.52%
Same Country 293998 36.56% 164918 51.25% 106182 29.00% 22563 19.63%
Different Country 11397 1.42% 6905 2.15% 3764 1.03% 722 0.63%
Total 804104 100.00% 321781 100.00% 366194 100.00% 114924 100.00%
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
Same NUTS3 245269 28.55% 116784 21.04% 109771 44.93% 18612 31.42%
Same NUTS2 143713 16.73% 78768 14.19% 52303 21.41% 12483 21.07%
Same NUTS1 94937 11.05% 57347 10.33% 27151 11.11% 10265 17.33%
Same Country 364768 42.45% 294384 53.04% 52938 21.67% 17221 29.07%
Different Country 10521 1.22% 7707 1.39% 2155 0.88% 655 1.11%
Total 859208 100.00% 554990 100.00% 244318 100.00% 59236 100.00%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
Same NUTS3 69116.87 37.32% 16380.60 25.66% 36529.76 43.36% 15932.26 43.57%
Same NUTS2 32475.32 17.54% 8420.58 13.19% 15982.05 18.97% 8010.77 21.91%
Same NUTS1 21385.18 11.55% 7987.69 12.51% 9229.23 10.96% 4113.45 11.25%
Same Country 58307.70 31.49% 28509.37 44.66% 21398.45 25.40% 8260.04 22.59%
Different Country 3897.76 2.10% 2543.57 3.98% 1101.41 1.31% 249.48 0.68%
Total 185182.83 100.00% 63841.81 100.00% 84240.90 100.00% 36565.99 100.00%
description Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
Same NUTS3 34954.45 38.70% 5707.96 22.18% 18854.64 43.08% 10143.09 49.65%
Same NUTS2 16680.73 18.47% 3078.97 11.96% 9019.73 20.61% 4555.43 22.30%
Same NUTS1 9143.01 10.12% 3365.44 13.08% 4166.69 9.52% 1595.01 7.81%
Same Country 27961.24 30.95% 12608.67 48.99% 11222.12 25.64% 4029.21 19.72%
Different Country 1589.81 1.76% 977.88 3.80% 501.78 1.15% 107.54 0.53%
Total 90329.24 100.00% 25738.92 100.00% 43764.96 100.00% 20430.29 100.00%
description Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
Same NUTS3 29530.71 35.47% 10007.96 28.59% 15458.63 43.90% 4043.25 31.36%
Same NUTS2 13890.43 16.69% 4929.47 14.08% 6093.66 17.30% 2832.29 21.97%
Same NUTS1 11278.15 13.55% 4327.97 12.36% 4633.47 13.16% 2278.50 17.67%
Same Country 26458.88 31.78% 14285.80 40.81% 8511.08 24.17% 3624.29 28.11%
Different Country 2091.26 2.51% 1457.96 4.16% 519.16 1.47% 113.45 0.88%
Total 83249.43 100.00% 35009.15 100.00% 35216.00 100.00% 12891.78 100.00%
Notes:  Panel A documents the number  and share of projects that were won by the same NUTS3, NUTS2, NUTS1, and the same country 
they were tendered by. Panel B shows the some when projects are weighted by the total final value in Euros.
Construction Works
Table 2: Cross-border Procurement
Panel A: Number of Projects
All projects
Panel B: Total Final Value in Euros
All Projects
Subsample: only Projects with "Most economically advantageous tender" award criteria
Subsample: only Projects with "Lowest price" award criteria
Subsample: only Projects with "Lowest price" award criteria
Subsample: only Projects with "Most economically advantageous tender" award criteria
All Goods Services
Services Construction Works
Services Construction WorksGoodsAll
All Goods
All Goods
All Goods Services Construction Works
All Goods Services
Services Construction Works
Construction Works
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Projects 
(Share)
Total Final 
Value (Share)
same_NUTS0 5.617*** 5.751*** 5.172*** 4.921*** 5.137*** 4.638***
(0.0702) (0.0708) (0.0869) (0.0981) (0.0835) (0.112)
same_NUTS1 0.714*** 0.447*** 0.452*** 0.908*** 0.518*** 0.524***
(0.0611) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0671) (0.0425) (0.0425)
same_NUTS2 0.739*** 0.811*** 0.813*** 0.813*** 0.836*** 0.839***
(0.0735) (0.0504) (0.0504) (0.0732) (0.0469) (0.0469)
same_NUTS3 1.244*** 0.718*** 0.722*** 1.266*** 0.552*** 0.559***
(0.0743) (0.0716) (0.0715) (0.0773) (0.0619) (0.0619)
Distance (log) -0.288*** -0.385*** -0.382*** -0.293*** -0.528*** -0.523***
(0.0449) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0533) (0.0302) (0.0303)
Origin population (log) -0.403*** -0.386***
(0.0229) (0.0220)
Dest. population (log) 1.189*** 1.111***
(0.0309) (0.0277)
Same Language 0.954*** 0.994***
(0.126) (0.118)
Same Currency 0.664*** 0.219
(0.154) (0.231)
Observations 1,844,155 1,845,510 1,845,510 1,840,072 1,840,072 1,840,072
R-squared 0.372 0.795 0.795 0.335 0.893 0.893
Origin NUTS3 FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Destination NUTS3 FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Total Final Value (in Euros)
Notes: The tables shows estimates of regression equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is the number of
projects in columns (1) to (3) and the total final value in million Euros in columns (4) to (6). The method of
estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Columns (1) and (4) include the total projects tendered
by authority i as an offset variable. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) contain origin- and destination NUTS3 region fixed
effects. Eicker-White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
Table 3: Main Results
Number of Projects
24 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Goods Services Works Goods Services Works
same_NUTS0 5.688*** 4.863*** 3.677*** 5.165*** 4.979*** 3.817***
(0.0979) (0.0823) (0.0843) (0.164) (0.103) (0.133)
same_NUTS1 0.182*** 0.721*** 0.725*** 0.142*** 0.615*** 0.688***
(0.0366) (0.0406) (0.0333) (0.0435) (0.0479) (0.0426)
same_NUTS2 0.467*** 1.004*** 0.725*** 0.440*** 1.025*** 0.754***
(0.0528) (0.0463) (0.0381) (0.0624) (0.0499) (0.0445)
same_NUTS3 0.206** 0.955*** 0.797*** -0.0460 0.675*** 0.698***
(0.0874) (0.0603) (0.0502) (0.0725) (0.0607) (0.0535)
Distance (log) -0.305*** -0.499*** -1.071*** -0.400*** -0.526*** -1.109***
(0.0347) (0.0288) (0.0207) (0.0308) (0.0316) (0.0266)
Same Language 0.411*** 1.131*** 1.950*** 0.382*** 0.888*** 1.924***
(0.145) (0.143) (0.150) (0.129) (0.157) (0.216)
Same Currency 0.796*** 0.355* 0.0950 0.117 0.353* 0.720**
(0.185) (0.201) (0.190) (0.299) (0.188) (0.338)
Observations 1,811,680 1,837,360 1,703,778 1,760,733 1,804,936 1,335,642
R-squared 0.872 0.881 0.928 0.917 0.941 0.926
Origin NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total Final Value in Euros
Notes: The tables shows estimates of regression equations (2). The dependent variable is the number of projects
involving goods, no goods, services, and construction in columns (1) to (3). In columns (4) to (6) the dependent
variable is the total final value in million Euros. The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML). All specification includes origin and destination NUTS3 region fixed effects. Eicker-White robust standard
errors  are shown in parantheses.
Table 4: Goods, Services, and Construction Works
Number of Projects
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Goods Services Works All Goods Services Works
same_NUTS0 4.365*** 4.696*** 4.453*** 3.328*** 4.159*** 4.510*** 4.472*** 3.354***
(0.0636) (0.0735) (0.0892) (0.101) (0.0738) (0.0925) (0.112) (0.192)
same_NUTS1 0.567*** 0.333*** 0.718*** 0.671*** 0.523*** 0.149*** 0.599*** 0.625***
(0.0324) (0.0337) (0.0389) (0.0409) (0.0414) (0.0416) (0.0485) (0.0544)
same_NUTS2 0.778*** 0.412*** 0.938*** 0.950*** 0.944*** 0.322*** 1.154*** 1.009***
(0.0455) (0.0449) (0.0513) (0.0491) (0.0449) (0.0470) (0.0528) (0.0617)
same_NUTS3 0.900*** 0.584*** 0.888*** 0.945*** 0.728*** 0.218*** 0.609*** 0.893***
(0.0648) (0.0745) (0.0692) (0.0554) (0.0628) (0.0794) (0.0621) (0.0639)
Distance (log) -0.516*** -0.450*** -0.536*** -1.063*** -0.608*** -0.533*** -0.604*** -1.108***
(0.0229) (0.0225) (0.0285) (0.0269) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0299) (0.0389)
Same Language 1.231*** 0.852*** 1.371*** 2.047*** 0.955*** 0.548*** 0.985*** 1.983***
(0.0874) (0.0881) (0.133) (0.176) (0.0968) (0.120) (0.180) (0.344)
Same Currency 0.731*** 0.897*** 0.463** 0.141 0.850*** 0.626*** 1.178*** 0.717
(0.136) (0.147) (0.218) (0.242) (0.130) (0.153) (0.225) (0.564)
Observations 1,800,939 1,699,112 1,772,850 1,414,320 1,779,492 1,623,012 1,706,810 870,420
R-squared 0.844 0.871 0.844 0.957 0.889 0.874 0.928 0.960
Origin NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Goods Services Works All Goods Services Works
same_NUTS0 5.898*** 6.241*** 5.381*** 4.111*** 5.177*** 5.603*** 5.554*** 4.383***
(0.128) (0.137) (0.131) (0.125) (0.222) (0.293) (0.165) (0.225)
same_NUTS1 0.231*** 0.0401 0.740*** 0.513*** 0.343*** 0.0728 0.582*** 0.487***
(0.0549) (0.0486) (0.0674) (0.0366) (0.0539) (0.0631) (0.0670) (0.0519)
same_NUTS2 0.818*** 0.444*** 1.126*** 0.405*** 0.692*** 0.498*** 0.835*** 0.445***
(0.0731) (0.0711) (0.0725) (0.0340) (0.0633) (0.106) (0.0662) (0.0482)
same_NUTS3 0.382*** -0.0673 1.004*** -0.0481 0.151* -0.211** 0.790*** -0.164***
(0.114) (0.105) (0.0884) (0.0448) (0.0813) (0.100) (0.0936) (0.0585)
Distance (log) -0.274*** -0.239*** -0.438*** -1.203*** -0.510*** -0.317*** -0.446*** -1.240***
(0.0542) (0.0490) (0.0519) (0.0206) (0.0429) (0.0502) (0.0496) (0.0275)
Same Language 0.967*** 0.337 1.235*** 1.889*** 0.897*** 0.307 0.949*** 1.475***
(0.227) (0.249) (0.217) (0.238) (0.197) (0.242) (0.261) (0.346)
Same Currency 0.205 0.276 -0.0253 0.0785 -0.341 -0.358 -0.403 0.940*
(0.279) (0.311) (0.309) (0.278) (0.359) (0.441) (0.261) (0.498)
Observations 1,796,700 1,507,124 1,711,360 1,340,696 1,687,368 1,276,740 1,510,110 909,084
R-squared 0.851 0.936 0.879 0.870 0.923 0.941 0.939 0.869
Origin NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B: Only Projects using the "Lowest Price" award criterion
Panel A: Only Projects using the "Most economically advantageous tender" award criterion
Notes: The tables shows estimates of regression equations (2). The subsample of projects using the "most economically
advantageous tender" (Panel A) or "lowest price" (Panel B) award criterion is used for estimation. The dependent variable is the
number of projects, the projects involving goods, services, and construction works in columns (1) to (4). In columns (5) to (8) the
dependent variable is the total final value in million Euros. The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML). All specification includes origin and destination NUTS3 region fixed effects. Eicker-White robust standard errors are
shown in parantheses.
Number of Projects
Number of Projects
Total Final Value in Euros
Total Final Value in Euros
Table 5: Award Criteria
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Goods Services Works All Goods Services Works
same_NUTS0 5.285*** 5.815*** 4.937*** 3.703*** 4.750*** 5.300*** 5.132*** 3.953***
(0.0927) (0.106) (0.0869) (0.0905) (0.162) (0.219) (0.119) (0.149)
same_NUTS1 0.424*** 0.180*** 0.707*** 0.708*** 0.516*** 0.156*** 0.602*** 0.691***
(0.0401) (0.0376) (0.0419) (0.0322) (0.0431) (0.0462) (0.0486) (0.0424)
same_NUTS2 0.801*** 0.480*** 1.020*** 0.713*** 0.838*** 0.471*** 1.055*** 0.742***
(0.0518) (0.0545) (0.0456) (0.0368) (0.0474) (0.0685) (0.0504) (0.0448)
same_NUTS3 0.713*** 0.196** 0.949*** 0.714*** 0.576*** -0.0375 0.696*** 0.665***
(0.0733) (0.0898) (0.0573) (0.0492) (0.0614) (0.0752) (0.0596) (0.0530)
Distance (log) -0.395*** -0.301*** -0.558*** -1.105*** -0.548*** -0.391*** -0.568*** -1.133***
(0.0364) (0.0362) (0.0290) (0.0203) (0.0315) (0.0337) (0.0328) (0.0266)
Same Language 1.128*** 0.676*** 1.136*** 2.177*** 1.218*** 0.694*** 0.943*** 1.979***
(0.140) (0.170) (0.143) (0.178) (0.121) (0.145) (0.186) (0.236)
Same Currency 0.676*** 0.737*** 0.515*** -0.0394 0.166 0.0372 0.444** 0.521
(0.184) (0.223) (0.198) (0.212) (0.297) (0.370) (0.212) (0.364)
Observations 1,844,148 1,808,976 1,830,560 1,688,148 1,840,072 1,754,090 1,783,428 1,273,536
R-squared 0.773 0.871 0.872 0.931 0.870 0.910 0.929 0.929
Origin NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 6: Open Procedure
Total Final Value in EurosNumber of Projects
Notes: The tables shows estimates of regression equations (2) using the subsample of projects published under the open
procedure. The dependent variable is the number of projects, the projects involving goods, services, and construction works in
columns (1) to (4). In columns (5) to (8) the dependent variable is the total final value in million Euros. The method of estimation
is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). All specification includes origin and destination NUTS3 region fixed effects.
Eicker-White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Goods Services Works All Goods Services Works
same_NUTS0 4.846*** 5.185*** 4.682*** 3.692*** 4.792*** 5.275*** 4.900*** 4.116***
(0.135) (0.190) (0.155) (0.117) (0.286) (0.436) (0.152) (0.210)
same_NUTS1 0.452*** 0.182*** 0.721*** 0.725*** 0.524*** 0.141*** 0.615*** 0.688***
(0.0386) (0.0366) (0.0406) (0.0334) (0.0426) (0.0434) (0.0479) (0.0426)
same_NUTS2 0.816*** 0.471*** 1.005*** 0.726*** 0.841*** 0.445*** 1.026*** 0.755***
(0.0504) (0.0529) (0.0463) (0.0381) (0.0470) (0.0636) (0.0499) (0.0445)
same_NUTS3 0.724*** 0.209** 0.956*** 0.798*** 0.559*** -0.0429 0.675*** 0.698***
(0.0715) (0.0874) (0.0603) (0.0502) (0.0619) (0.0726) (0.0607) (0.0535)
Distance (log) -0.380*** -0.301*** -0.498*** -1.071*** -0.522*** -0.398*** -0.525*** -1.109***
(0.0339) (0.0347) (0.0288) (0.0207) (0.0304) (0.0312) (0.0316) (0.0266)
Trust -2.169*** -2.238*** -1.287*** -1.579*** -1.792*** -1.833*** -0.755* -2.881***
(0.364) (0.442) (0.439) (0.515) (0.580) (0.704) (0.429) (0.801)
Hierarchy 0.0386 -0.273 -1.378 0.636 0.655 0.642 -2.195** 3.285**
(0.875) (1.035) (1.169) (0.828) (1.393) (1.797) (0.862) (1.392)
Individualism -0.807 -2.053 0.808 1.170 2.431** 1.789 1.806** 2.982***
(1.016) (1.319) (0.991) (0.739) (1.198) (1.489) (0.770) (1.066)
Same Language 0.930*** 0.446*** 1.119*** 1.907*** 0.966*** 0.311** 0.939*** 1.873***
(0.102) (0.110) (0.129) (0.169) (0.108) (0.127) (0.156) (0.228)
Same Currency 0.734*** 0.906*** 0.369* 0.0389 0.156 0.0499 0.342* 0.633*
(0.169) (0.212) (0.208) (0.194) (0.259) (0.343) (0.191) (0.333)
Observations 1,842,794 1,808,989 1,834,650 1,701,168 1,837,360 1,758,080 1,802,250 1,333,326
R-squared 0.795 0.872 0.881 0.928 0.893 0.917 0.941 0.926
Origin NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 7: Cultural Distance
Number of Projects Total Final Value in Euros
Notes: The tables shows estimates of and extended regression equation (2) that, following Ahern et al. (2015), includes three
measures that capture national attitudes regarding (i) trust versus distrust, (ii) hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and (iii)
individualism versus collectivism. The dependent variable is the number of projects, the projects involving goods, services, and
construction works in columns (1) to (4). In columns (5) to (8) the dependent variable is the total final value in million Euros. The
method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). All specification includes origin and destination NUTS3
region fixed effects. Eicker-White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
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Figure 1: Share of cross-border by NUTS3 region 
  
Notes: The figure shows the share of cross-border (NUTS0) procurement share by origin NUTS3 region. 
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Figure 2: Example of the geographic distribution of awards 
Notes: Clockwise from the top left, the figure shows the geographic distribution of contract awards by 
contracting authorities or entities (CAE) located in NUTS2 regions Cologne (DEA2), Darmstadt/Frankfurt am 
Main (DE71), Corsica (FR83), and Sardinia (ITG2). 
 
